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This paper addresses the problem to accurately determine buyout opportunity cost of capital for 
performance analyses. It draws on a unique and proprietary set of data on 133 United States 
buyouts between 1984 and 2004. For each of them, we determine a public market equivalent that 
matches it with respect to its timing and its systematic risk. We show that under realistic 
mimicking conditions, the average opportunity cost of capital is below the commonly used 
benchmark S&P 500. The surprising result has a simple explanation: ex post, many of the 
transactions mimicking the buyouts would have defaulted in the public market. Only under 
relaxed assumptions is the average opportunity cost of capital close to the average index return. 
Our sensitivity analyses highlight the necessity of a comprehensive risk-adjustment that considers 
both operating risk and leverage risk for an accurate assessment of buyout performance. This 
finding is particularly important as existing literature on that topic tends to rely on benchmarks 
without a proper risk-adjustment. 
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Since the late 1970s buyouts
1 have become an important asset class with significant economic 
impact.
2 Yet relatively little is known about the risk and return characteristics of this type of 
investment. This is largely due to two factors. First, buyout investments differ substantially 
from public market investments in several important characteristics, especially regarding 
liquidity and information symmetry. This implies theoretical challenges with respect to the 
assessment of their risk and return. Second, buyout investments are a sub-category of the 
private equity asset class for which general disclosure requirements do not exist. In the absence 
of detailed information on the underlying transactions and their investment characteristics, 
risk-adjusted returns are impossible to calculate. To prove that is the major contribution of our 
paper, we assess the opportunity cost of capital of buyout transactions by public market 
investments with an equal risk profile. For this assessment, we draw on a unique and 
proprietary set of data on target-company and industry characteristics, as well as the applied 
financial structures of 133 United States buyouts. Based on this information, we construct a 
mimicking portfolio of investments in the S&P 500 Index, with additionally borrowed or lent 
funds to adjust for the applied degrees of leverage. These mimicking investments match the 
buyouts in terms of the timing of their cash flows and their systematic risk pattern. The 
systematic risk of buyout transactions usually changes during the holding period. Being 
initially high due to the amount of debt used for financing the transaction, the risk decreases in 
the following periods as debt is repaid. Our mimicking investments exactly replicate this 
evolution of the buyout risk patterns over time. 
The chosen public market equivalent is not intended to present a “buyout pricing model” nor 
does it imply that buyouts can be replicated adequately with traded securities. We simply 
propose an approach to benchmarking them in what we regard as the best possible way. For 
                                              
1 In the literature, buyout transactions are variously labelled (e.g., leveraged buyout, management buyout, 
institutional buyout, management buy-in, etc.) and these terms are often used synonymously. In this paper the term 
"buyout" is preferred as being the broadest covering the different facets of this transaction type. 
2 The historical evolvement of the asset class, different cycles and its economic impact are well reported in 
Lowenstein (1985), Sahlman and Stevenson (1985), Sahlman (1990), Smith (1990), and Kaplan and Stein (1993) for 
the late 1970s and 1980s. See Jeng and Wells (1998) for the 1980s and 1990s. See Gompers and Lerner (1999a) and 
(2000) for an overall summary, and see the current yearbooks of the National Venture Capital Association and the 
European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association for actual market data.  
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this method, we adopt the perspective of a well-diversified investor, such as a fund of fund 
investor, pension fund or a university endowment. This is a reasonable assumption as such 
investors are the primary providers of capital for buyout transactions. Consequently, we do not 
consider idiosyncratic risks in our analyses because these investors are not affected by 
idiosyncratic shocks. Our stylized model follows the alternative decision to either invest in 
buyouts or in quoted assets. Thereby we control for the systematic risk involved, but not for 
liquidity risk, size, or other factors. 
The contributions of this paper are several. First, our method of benchmarking the buyout asset 
class with the public market could evolve into a standard for buyout performance measurement. 
Second, we apply this method in an empirical analysis on a comprehensive and unique data set 
and reveal the importance of a correct specification of risks taken by lenders, cost of borrowing 
and lending, and potential changes of the operating risk profile of the buyout targets. We 
illustrate that it is insufficient to assess the performance of buyout transactions without 
thoroughly determining leverage ratios, risks borne by lenders, and controlling for the 
systematic risks carried by the sponsors. This finding is important for the interpretation of 
results from some of the most recent literature, such as Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008), 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003), as data limitations depending 
on their data sources make our proposed way of risk separation impossible in these studies. We 
show that, under what we regard as the most realistic mimicking approach, the average buyout 
opportunity cost of capital is 9.07%, while the median is 12.16%. This is significantly 3.29% 
(2.79%) below what would have been earned on average (medial) if the investors had invested 
in the time matching S&P 500 portfolio (with an average return of 12.36%, and a median of 
14.95%). It seems surprising that the average return of the levered index portfolio is less than 
the average return of the index. However, the explanation is rather simple: Many public market 
mimicking transactions would have defaulted due to the leverage ratios applied in the buyouts. 
Default is triggered if the equity value invested in the mimicking portfolio melts down to zero. 
The detected deviation from the S&P 500 returns results from controlling for the risks taken by 
lenders in the buyout transactions and the corresponding cost of debt. Relaxing our approach, 
and assuming riskless borrowing and lending, leads to average (median) opportunity cost of 
capital of 12.89% (12.59%). The average return is slightly higher than the average return earned 
if the correct mimicking portfolio is indeed the S&P 500. However, the median return is slightly 
smaller. As a conclusion, we claim that neglecting different degrees of leverage, and using the 
returns of the S&P 500 for simplicity as opportunity cost of capital to benchmark buyout 
transactions leads to preliminary results, unless the detected difference is an appropriate 
premium for illiquidity and/or other risk factors. However, the exposure of buyout transactions 
to other risk factors is not yet sufficiently researched, and this is also not the subject of this 
paper. 
The third contribution of our paper are the sensitivity analyses and robustness checks, where 
we provide further insights into the nature of buyout transactions and the financial drivers of 
their performance. The analyses confirm that buyout transactions tend to be more successful 
relative to their public market benchmark if the buyout fund managers are able to transfer 
substantial parts of the risk to the lenders. 
Finally, it is important to note that our approach relies on completed and audited transactions 
only. This removes the necessity of dealing with interim valuations and missing values, as 
reported by Rotch (1968), Poindexter (1975), Peng (2001a and 2001b), Quigley and Woodward 
(2002 and 2003), Cochrane (2005), and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008). It is due to issues such 
as these that performance analyses become both difficult and questionable because the methods  
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of correction transfer the historical development and return patterns on the non-exited and 
current transactions. This might cause a substantial bias due to market conditions that have 
changed meanwhile. 
2. Background 
Buyouts, as Sahlman (1990), and Lerner (2000) point out, represent one strand of the private 
equity (PE) asset class. This asset category is based on the relationship between an institutional 
investor and an intermediary (the PE fund or investee). PE funds are usually structured as a 
limited partnership, with a management team (termed the “general partner”) that manages the 
investments of the limited partners. Investors in the fund then hold shares as limited partners. 
Buyout funds concentrate their investments on mature companies. In most cases, the 
companies’ shares are not traded on a public stock market, though a particular type of 
transaction described by Lowenstein (1985), called “going privates,” target quoted companies. A 
defining feature of the asset class is that, for the “going privates” as well as for the privately 
held target corporations, once a general partner has invested in a company, its shares are no 
longer publicly traded over her holding period. The exposure is typically structured as, or 
highly like, equity claims (common and preferred). For each transaction an investment vehicle 
is created, funded by one or several buyout funds as well as other parties, such as senior and 
subordinated debt providers and mezzanine investors. The nature of these is investigated by 
Kaplan and Stein (1990) and Cotter and Peck (2001). The target company’s management team, 
its employees or new external managers may also subscribe for equity stakes, but their stakes 
are usually small compared to the institutional investors’ participation. The transaction vehicle 
acquires assets or shares of the target company and/or will merge with it, thus creating a 
unique opportunity highlighted by Jensen (1986) to specify a capital structure and design 
particular claims and incentives. The principle to found a special purpose vehicle for every 
single transaction is a particularly important feature with respect to the subsequently proposed 
mimicking approach. The legal construction secures that the liability of the buyout fund is 
limited to its equity exposure. The sponsor’s individual assets do not serve as collateral for 
other ones. As a consequence, debt financing for an individual portfolio company is granted 
against the particular portfolio company’s assets only, and hence, more costly than the risk free 
rate. 
The transaction date is called the closing date. At the end of the holding period (called exit), all 
claims are usually sold either via privately negotiated sales or through Initial Public Offerings. 
If not all shares are sold at IPO, the general partners liquidate their holdings subsequently or 
directly transfer the shares to the limited partners. In any case it is not the investors’ goal to 
maintain exposure in the public stock market. Unsuccessful engagements are written off, 
eventually to a zero value. Some transactions might be only partly sold and/or re-levered to 
benefit once more from debt finance. 
Buyout funds tend to act as active investors, as comprehensively discussed by Jensen (1989a 
and 1989b). Their role involves monitoring, managing and restructuring the target companies 
to create value. Kaplan (1989a and 1989b, 1991), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Smith (1990), 
and Berg and Gottschalg (2005) argue that this is a key determinant for the success of buyout 
transactions. To secure their influence on the target companies, buyout funds seek to obtain the 
majority of voting rights either alone or together with other financial investors via equity  
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syndications. This is not a necessary condition however, and, depending on the buyout size and 
structure, the majorities can vary. 
A second strand of the PE asset class is constituted by VC investments, as discussed by Bygrave 
and Timmons (1992), Gompers (1998) and Gompers and Lerner (1999a and 2000). Buyouts and 
venture capital differ substantially in terms of the investment risk profile. While buyout funds 
invest in mature companies in traditionally stable industries using financial leverage, VC 
funds typically acquire minority stakes of early stage businesses in volatile growth industries 
with minimal or no debt financing. These fundamental differences make it necessary to treat 
the two sub-categories of the private equity asset class separately in the assessment of risk and 
return; it is also why this paper focuses exclusively on buyout transactions. 
3. Related Literature 
Strikingly, recent research on the risk and return of private equity has lead to contradictory 
findings. As we will show in this section, different approaches to correct for sample selection 
biases and to adjust for risk may be responsible for a large part of these inconsistencies. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that many studies do not sufficiently differentiate between 
the different risk-characteristics of the venture capital and the buyout asset class. The key 
papers are discussed below before we highlight how our paper differs from the related literature. 
Gompers and Lerner (1997) address the “stale price” problem and propose market tracking as a 
tool for measuring risk-adjusted returns of buyouts. The term “stale price” is used to describe 
the fact that market valuations of PE transactions are only available at two dates (if at all): the 
entry and the exit date. Hence, the common risk measure standard deviation of periodic returns 
is meaningless for the asset class. The authors benchmark the individual transactions by 
building equally weighted indexes of publicly quoted companies sharing the same three-digit 
SIC codes. They then analyze one single buyout fund using these indexes as a performance 
indicator (if neither cash payments nor write-offs exist), modeling the quarterly exposure of its 
investments. If a payment or write-off occurs, then a new company value can be calculated and 
attributed to the transaction. Gompers and Lerner (1997) concede that their approach assumes 
perfect correlation between the target company valuations and the chosen index. Moreover, the 
authors argue that this could overstate the risk involved. Using their approach, the authors find 
superior performance for this single buyout fund. 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) use extensive data obtained from a fund of fund investor 
regarding cash outflows, inflows and management fees for investments in 73 different PE 
funds. To determine risk-adjusted returns they calculate industry beta factors using the 
methodology of Fama and French (1997). Without data on the leverage of the target companies, 
they are unable to correct for different degrees of leverage, and therefore implicitly assume 
average industry debt/equity ratios within their analysis. From this, they obtain an average beta 
factor of all the different PE fund portfolios of 1.08 and an average annual internal rate of 
return of 21.83%. This greatly exceeds the S&P 500 Index performance during the same period 
of 14.1% per annum. The authors argue that, provided the degrees of leverage were no higher 
than about twice the industry average, a risk-adjusted premium exists for the PE transactions. 
However, they acknowledge that their PE-fund sample may not be a random draw from the 
general population. 
Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) investigate the idiosyncratic risks of PE transactions, arguing 
that they play an important role that must be priced. They find that investors in PE funds do  
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not earn positive alphas. Surprisingly, they also find that funds exposed to more idiosyncratic 
risk earn higher returns than more diversified portfolios. Groh, Baule and Gottschalg (2009) 
determine idiosyncratic buyout risks with a contingent claim approach based on the Ho and 
Singer (1984) model to price risky debt with an amortization payment. They find high Sharpe-
ratios of the buyouts but face a severe selection bias in their sample of transactions. 
Quigley and Woodward (2002) and Woodward and Hall (2003) develop a VC price index based 
on the Repeat Sales Regression Method introduced by Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) to 
benchmark real estate investments. Quigley and Woodward (2002) further correct for sample 
selection bias with Heckit Two Step Regression. The authors use proprietary data on 5,607 
companies that received venture capital in 12,553 financing rounds between 1987 and 2000. 
Quigley and Woodward (2002) calculate Sharpe-ratios of their VC index and of the S&P 500, 
and the NASDAQ Index. Both stock market indexes have to be considered superior to VC in 
terms of the ratio between risk and return. However, the authors conclude that for 
diversification purposes, securities portfolios should include 10% to 15% of VC exposure. 
Similar to Peng (2001a and 2001b) and Quigley and Woodward (2002), Cochrane (2005) points 
out that empirical VC research usually only observes valuations if target companies go public, 
receive new financing or are acquired by third parties. These events are more likely to occur 
when good returns have already been experienced and this results in a sample selection bias 
that the author overcomes via a maximum likelihood estimate. He measures the probability of 
observing a return as the company values increase. His approach implies the assumption that 
historical development patterns of the portfolio companies remain stable and are applicable to 
estimate the value of current and non-exited projects. Cochrane (2005) uses data on 16,613 
financing rounds between 1987 and June 2000 for 7,765 target companies from the 
VentureOne database. This database includes buyout and venture capital transactions but 
the VC segment notably dominates the data. With his reweighing procedure Cochrane (2005) 
calculates an arithmetic mean return of 59% and underlines the high idiosyncratic risks of the 
particular transactions. He directly models the returns to equity and does not control for 
leverage risks. He compares the returns with the corresponding returns of the S&P 500 Index 
and with several portfolios taken from the NASDAQ Index. Considering these different 
benchmark portfolios he finds alphas ranging from 22% to 45%. Regarding the slopes of the 
regressions he argues that VC is riskier than the S&P 500 Index. For the different NASDAQ 
portfolios Cochrane (2005) determines regression slopes between 0.5 and 1.4 and argues that 
VC can have either greater or lower risk than the benchmark depending on the choice of the 
NASDAQ portfolio. 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) employ a public market equivalent approach to benchmark PE funds. 
They construct a mimicking portfolio for a large sample of PE funds contained in the Thomson 
Venture Economics database, investing the same amount over an equally long period in the 
S&P 500 Index and comparing the PE fund performance to the index returns. Within their 
approach, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) presume that PE investments are as risky as the S&P 500 
portfolio and hence, have a beta equal to one. The authors conclude that average buyout fund 
returns are, after fees, slightly smaller than those of the S&P 500. Gross of fees the asset class 
earns returns exceeding the chosen benchmark. They also report a strong persistence of the 
performance (negative as well as positive) of the particular funds and a higher performance for 
larger funds and more experienced management teams. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) acknowledge 
that their results may be misleading however, as by not controlling for different risk patterns in 
the individual transactions they assume that the appropriate buyout cost of capital is the return  
6 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
of the S&P 500 Index. They also do not correct for a potential selection bias that might exist in 
their sample. 
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008) extend the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) article. They calculate 
public market equivalents for cash flows to and from buyout funds, and also use the time 
matching returns of the S&P 500 as opportunity cost of capital. They focus on the correction of 
unrealized, but reported net asset values and run several analyses applying various approaches 
to partially or fully write them off. They find that gross of fees their sample funds outperform 
the S&P 500 by 3% p.a. Net of fees the performance is 3% below the benchmark. In a 
robustness check, they calculate unlevered and levered beta factors with a method similar to the 
one we will apply to perform a risk-adjustment. However, without data on the target 
companies’ leverage, the authors are unable to correct for different degrees of leverage in their 
sample transactions. They calculate equity beta factors similar to Ljungqvist and Richardson 
(2003) with initial debt/equity ratios of 3 and final debt/equity ratios at average industry levels. 
In their unlevering and re-levering approach they assume a corporate tax rate of 35%, a debt 
beta of 0.25 for the buyouts and 0 for the public market and do not differentiate the risks of 
debt tax shields in the quoted and unquoted market segment. They also do not control for 
different cost of borrowing and lending. Using the average buyout case, Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2008) find underperformance of the buyouts with respect to the S&P 500. 
Our study differs from and aims to extend prior work in several ways. First and most 
importantly, it constitutes the first large-scale analysis on the cost of capital for buyouts that 
fully corrects for operating risk, leverage risk, and leverage cost. Using precise information on 
the valuations of individual target companies, their competitors in their industry sector and on 
the capital structures of the investment vehicles at the closing date and at exit, it becomes 
possible for us to attribute a systematic risk measure to every transaction. This risk measure is 
neither an average over several transactions nor constant over time. There is, rather, an 
individual risk pattern for every single transaction. This pattern typically starts at higher risks 
due to initially higher degrees of leverage, and consecutively decreases, due to the redemption 
of debt. The redemption capabilities of the target corporations vary to a great extent and, 
hence, this underlines the variety of the risk patterns in buyout financing. We are able to 
control for these patterns by constructing well-defined, equally risky mimicking investments 
that can be used to determine the opportunity cost of capital of buyout transactions. We show 
that the consideration of leverage risk and cost is of great importance. Also, as Ljungqvist and 
Richardson (2003), and Kaplan and Schoar (2005) note, any findings regarding the performance 
of buyouts that do not appropriately adjust for the effect of leverage have to be interpreted with 
great caution. We are able to illustrate the effect of different choices regarding the treatment of 
the risk patterns and the cost of debt for the relative performance of this asset class. 
Further, this paper focuses exclusively on investments of buyout funds, as the category of PE in 
which leverage plays a crucial role. It thereby avoids mixing two asset classes (venture capital 
and buyouts) that have substantially different risk and return characteristics. Additionally, we 
only rely on fully completed (exited and audited) transactions. Hence, we avoid the problem of 
missing values and do not need to vaguely estimate interim valuations for our transactions 
from historical return patterns nor to handle reported net asset values. Next, we provide 
detailed insights into risk characteristics and drivers of performance of this asset class. Our 
findings contrast the performance impact of: a) systematic operating risk, and, b) leverage risk; 
with c) the joint impact of both factors. Moreover, we explicitly analyze the sensitivity of our 
results with respect to different assumptions regarding the risk patterns of the individual  
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transactions. Therefore we vary the assumptions about debt risk, the risk of debt tax shields, 
credit spreads, and operating risks in the industry sectors. 
4. Data Collection and Sample Description 
The availability of data of sufficient breadth and depth has been one of the key constraints in 
addressing the question of the opportunity cost of capital for buyouts. As we show in this 
paper, mimicking buyout investments with public market instruments on a risk-adjusted basis 
requires information on the industry segment of the target companies, the timing and size of 
underlying cash flows, as well as the capital structure of the acquiring investment vehicles at 
least at entry and exit. This data is neither publicly available, nor is it listed in any of the 
commonly used databases, such as Thomson Venture Economics or VentureOne. Rather, it can 
only be gathered directly from institutions investing in buyouts as either general or limited 
partners. While this approach has advantages regarding the depth of available data, it leads to 
potential selection and survivorship biases. In the following, we describe the data sources and 
sample characteristics of the data used in this study and discuss a potential bias. 
Our dataset is compiled from information on buyout funds made available to us anonymously 
either directly from general partners or through limited partners. Limited partners collect 
detailed information on general partners as part of the due diligence processes for their fund 
allocations. Each year, limited partners often screen hundreds of new buyout funds. In a special 
document (the so-called Private Placement Memorandum - PPM), general partners describe 
their previous transactions in order to raise a new fund. The PPM are submitted to potential 
limited partners and used by them to assess the general partner’s quality and strategy. These 
documents contain information about all past transactions carried out by the general partner. 
The data on individual transactions used in this study has been extracted from PPM. Our data 
providers are among the world’s largest limited partners and collectively manage more than 
United States $40 billion in the PE asset class. Needless to say, PPM documents are highly 
confidential and, to the best of our knowledge, have never been used in academic research. 
As no standard format exists for reporting transactions in PPM, the documents are very 
heterogeneous in terms of the level of detail provided for each transaction – both within one 
fund and across general partners. As a result, the data necessary to perform our proposed 
method of risk-adjustment was extracted only for a small subset of transactions. Moreover, as 
only fully exited transactions are considered here, the size of the available sample shrinks 
further. Because this study’s objective is to assess the opportunity cost of capital for “buyouts,” 
we only consider investments performed by funds that refer to themselves explicitly as a 
“buyout fund.” For instance, the 122 PPM supplied to us by our research partners described 
2,264 realized buyout transactions (1,001 of which were in the United States) made through 170 
buyout funds (some PPM report on several funds) raised between 1981 and 2004. From this 
large number of transactions, we only collect 152 transactions for which the following data is 
available. First, for closing: the date, company valuation, acquired equity stake, amount paid 
for the equity, target-company industry and a short product and market description, or 
description of competitors (in order to determine its SIC code). Second, for the exit: the date, 
company valuation, equity stake and amount returned to the buyout fund. Finally, in order to 
verify that the underlying cash flows are correctly matched, the investment’s gross internal rate 
of return reported in the PPM is needed. Some problems and shortcomings of the internal rate 
of return as a performance measure for buyout transactions are discussed in Kaplan and Schoar  
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(2005), Phalippou (2008), and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008). However, we only use the 
internal rates of return of the transactions to verify that we correctly match all their underlying 
cash flows. 
The vast majority of the collected 152 target companies are based in the United States, with the 
remainder based in the United Kingdom, continental Europe and Japan. As the non-United 
States results would lack statistical weight for any individual country while also distorting the 
United States results and raising questions about cross-currency returns, the availability of 
public peers and adequate benchmark portfolios, we decided to exclude all non-United States 
transactions. This finally leaves us with 133 transactions executed by 41 different funds. For 
each of these transactions we are able to create the exact individual financial risk profile 
considering operating risk, initial financial leverage, and subsequent redemption of debt. In 
several transactions, meaningful additional “add-on payments” occurred in subsequent 
financing rounds as well as premature disbursements. These payments influence the investor’s 
exposure and the internal rates of return on the particular transactions. Staged investments 
usually have a lower risk than the initial payment given the debt redemption that takes place 
until the moment of the add-on payment. Similarly, premature disbursements or large 
dividends financed by recapitalizations usually have a higher risk than at the end of the 
holding period. To accurately track the risks of these buyouts with the mimicking investments, 
all underlying cash flows have to be matched. Our sample transactions show the following 
characteristics, exhibited in Table 1: The first transaction was closed in November 1984 and the 
last was exited by June 2004: 16 transactions were closed in the 1980s, 31 in the early 1990s 
and 74 in the late 1990s, while the remaining were closed in the new millennium. The holding 
periods range from three months to 15 years plus one month. The average and the median 
holding period are below four years, respectively. The equity stakes range from 8% to 100% 
ownership, where the average (median) is 76% (86%). This figure in general reflects the strategy 
of securing majority-voting rights in target companies in order to be able to control them 
effectively. The minor equity stakes in a few transactions represent syndicated equity layers. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Data 
  Min  Max  Average Median Std. Dev. 
Closing Date  Nov 84  Mar 03  Nov 95  Jul 96   
Exit Date  Feb 88  Jun 04  Jul 99  Dec 99   
Holding Period [years]  0.25  15.08 3.75 3.08 2.61 
Equity Stake at Closing  8%  100% 76% 86% 0.25 
Equity Stake at Exit  8%  100% 74% 86% 0.27 
Initial Debt/Equity  0  17.05 2.94 2.49 2.75 
Exit Debt/Equity  0  14.09 1.28 0.64 1.99 
Enterprise Value at Closing [$m]  3.50  almost 
9,000  313.52 88.00  870.17 
Enterprise Value at Exit [$m]  0.001  almost 
13,500  547.90 135.00  1,366.82 
Equity Investment [$m]  0.20  almost 
1,150  53.39 18.70  115.79 
Final Payoff [$m]  0.001  almost 
1,800  160.38 63.10  299.05 
IRR (p.a.)  -100.00%  472.00% 50.08% 35.70%  0.92  
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Regarding the degrees of financial leverage, the average (median) debt to equity ratio is 2.94 
(2.49) at closing, and 1.28 (0.64) at exit. Some of the transactions do not include any debt. 
However, some of the buyouts are highly levered with degrees up to 17.05. The high average 
and median degree of financial leverage found in our sample emphasizes the need to consider 
the effect of leverage risk in the performance assessment. 
While at closing, the enterprise values of the target companies range from $3.5 million to 
almost $9,000 million, the average (median) is $313.5 million ($88.0 million). At exit, the 
enterprise values range from $0.001 million (a write off) to almost $13,500 million with an 
average (median) of $547.9 million ($135.0 million). Similarly, the amount of equity invested 
ranges from $0.2 million in a small and syndicated transaction to almost $1,150 million 
signaling the large exposure in certain transactions. On average (median) the amount of equity 
invested is $53.4 million ($18.7 million). The final payoffs range between $0.001 million (a 
write off) and almost $1,800 million with an average of $160.4 million and a median of 
$63.1 million. 
The descriptive statistics further reveal the diversity of the transactions made by the buyout 
funds, e.g., with holding periods ranging from three months to 15 years or equity exposure 
between $0.2 million and $1,150 million. With respect to transaction size and the observed 
financial structures, our sample can be regarded as “typical” compared to other samples, such 
as DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1987), Kaplan and Stein (1990 and 1993), Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990), and Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2007). 
The internal rates of return gross of fees range from –100% (total write off within a year) to as 
high as 472% p.a. However, the mean average IRR of all the transactions and the median are 
50.08% p.a. and 35.70% p.a., respectively. Since these figures do not consider differences in 
either the amounts invested or their duration, we also calculate the aggregate IRR over all the 
underlying cash flows, which is 33.19% p.a. This corresponds to the gross return an investor 
would have gained by participating in all of our sample transactions in an equal proportion of 
the equity values. We also calculate the invested-capital-weighted IRR of all the cash flows, 
which is 30.95% p.a. These figures seem high, but are reported gross of all fees. The final 
returns to investors are much lower after deducting the fees typically paid in this asset class. 
Usually fees are structured as an annual percentage of the capital under management 
(‘management fee’ of 1-4%) plus a performance related share (‘carried interest’ of 15%-35% of 
the returns), which is often subject to a hurdle rate. Alternatively, the management fee might be 
payable on invested funds. Anyway, fee structures are opaque and incomparable, as catch-up 
clauses might protect LPs from deteriorating returns over the life time of the fund, or as the 
timing of the carry payment also affects the final returns to investors.
3 
As detailed information about the entire population of buyout investments is unavailable, we 
can only speculate whether our sample represents typical transaction sizes, transaction 
structures, leverage ratios, sourcing or exit channels, or preferred industry segments at the time. 
At least, the ratios and dimensions of our sample transactions are very similar to those from 
other researchers, as discussed above. However, given the long sample horizon – from 1984 to 
2004 – it should be stressed that trends, market conditions, debt interest rates and disclosed 
                                              
3 A comprehensive description and discussion of compensation models can be found in Bygrave, Fast, Khoylian, 
Vincent, and Yue (1985), p. 96; Jensen (1989a), p. 68 and (1989b), p. 37; Sahlman (1990), p. 491; Murray and 
Marriott (1998), p. 966; Gompers and Lerner (1999a, p. 57 and 1999b), p. 7; Metrick (2006); Metrick and Yasuda 
(2008), and Phalippou (2009).  
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returns on buyout transactions changed significantly within that period. The entire capital 
market segment passed two cycles, as reported by Gompers and Lerner (1999a and 2000). 
However, the temporal composition of our sample with 16 transactions from the 1980s, 31 from 
the early 1990s, 74 from the late 1990s and the remainder after 2000 represents the historical 
evolvement of the asset class. 
Available datasets on PE transactions (such as Thomson Venture Economics or VentureOne) 
usually do not contain any economic information other than the timing and the amount of 
cash flows. Additionally, it is impossible for us to trace our sample transactions in any one 
of these (and similar) databases, since they are kept anonymous. In general, our data gathering 
process is not determined by any economic variable but only by the facts that we first need to 
have a relationship with a research partner, and second the available PPM must provide 
sufficient information on the track records. Due to these facts and the impossibility of tracing 
our sample transactions in any other database, we unfortunately cannot quantify the extent to 
which our sample is biased through sample attrition. We rely on the data provided by the PPM 
as a single but primary and reliable source. It should be noted that the information provided is 
based on audited numbers and audited transactions. 
Given the source of our data, there are good reasons for suspecting an upward return bias in 
our sample. First, we have to consider a possible selection bias arising from the GPs’ reporting 
policy. GPs have an incentive to provide detailed information only for their successful 
transactions in the PPM, which is primarily a marketing instrument for fundraising. Second, we 
have to expect a survivorship bias based on the mechanism that unsuccessful GPs will find it 
difficult or even impossible to raise another fund. Hence, they will never write a PPM that 
reports their past unsuccessful investments. A sample like ours, which is derived from PPM 
information, will therefore be systematically biased towards the more successful fund managers 
that ‘survive’. We address this issue in the next section after the introduction of our mimicking 
approach, and after the presentation of the results. 
5. The Mimicking Portfolio of the Buyouts 
To assess the opportunity cost of capital for buyouts, we create a mimicking portfolio of public 
market investments. These investments are designed to replicate the risk profile of the buyouts 
in terms of their timing and their systematic risk.  
The determination of the mimicking portfolio requires for each buyout: a) the identification of a 
peer group of publicly traded companies with the same operating risk; b) the calculation of the 
equity betas for each of these ‘public peers’; c) the unlevering of these beta factors to derive 
their operating or unlevered betas; d) the determination of a market weighted average of these 
operating betas for every peer group; and e) the re-levering of these peer group operating betas 
on the level of the buyout transactions at closing, and exit. The unlevering and re-levering 
procedures also require the specification of the risk, which is borne by the lenders, the risk of 
tax shields, as well as an applicable corporate tax rate.  
With the individual buyout betas the mimicking portfolio can be established as follows: for 
every buyout transaction, an equal amount of equity is invested in a market proxy-portfolio 
which is levered up with borrowed funds until it matches the equity beta factor of the buyout at 
closing. If the buyout’s beta is lower than 1, funds can be lent. The timing of the mimicking 
investments corresponds to the closing dates. The risk of the public market transaction is then 
adjusted every year, tracking the risk of the buyouts. Therefore, every position is liquidated  
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annually, interest is paid, debt is redeemed and the residual equity is levered up again with 
borrowed funds (respectively funds are lent) to the prevailing systematic risk of the buyout. At 
this point, the value of the equity might have approached zero. This triggers default of the 
mimicking transaction and its return is calculated up to this point. The procedure is repeated 
until the exit date (for the “no default cases”). Then, the position is closed and, after serving 
debt, we receive a residual cash flow to the investor, which represents the final payoff. We can 
easily calculate the returns of these cash flows which represent the opportunity cost of capital 
of the buyouts. 
The individual steps and the necessary assumptions used to construct the mimicking portfolio 
are discussed in detail in the Appendix. The approach enables the analyses described in the 
following section. 
6. Analyses and Results 
First, we can compare the leverage pattern of buyouts with that of their publicly quoted peers 
(see Table 1). With respect to leverage risk, we find that at closing the average debt/equity ratio 
of the buyout investments is 2.94 and their median is 2.49. At exit those ratios are 1.28 (mean 
average), and 0.64 (median) respectively. In comparison, the mean average leverage ratio of all 
quoted peers over the five years is 1.38, while the median is 0.83. That means that on average 
our sample transactions are initially levered more than twice as much as their public peers. 
When exited, the target companies have even lower leverage ratios than their public peers. This 
finding should be contrasted with the literature. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) argue that 
buyout transactions create excess value as long as they don’t use less than 0.476 the amount of 
equity used by their quoted peers under the conservative assumption of risk-free debt. We show 
that, while this ratio is initially 0.47, it rises to 1.08, and hence is 0.77 on average between 
closing and exit of a transaction. This, and the introduction of risky debt, would have increased 
the level of outperformance found in Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003). 
Second, we take a look at the operating risk and find that the resulting unlevered beta factors 
range between 0.32 (0.05 percentile) and 1.40 (0.95 percentile). The mean average of the 
unlevered beta factors is 0.67 and their median is 0.56. This is not surprising, as buyout fund 
managers typically choose low volatile businesses for their investments and, hence, the 
unlevered beta factors of target companies should be low in general.
4 
Third, the resulting systematic risk of the transactions ranges between 0.32 (0.05 percentile) and 
3.88 (0.95 percentile) at closing, with a mean of 1.40 and a median of 0.94. At exit the equity 
betas are between 0.32 (0.05 percentile) and 2.80 (0.95 percentile), with a mean of 1.01 and a 
median of 0.71. From that, we can calculate an average beta factor for all the transactions and 
over the holding periods of 1.21. This signals the need for adjustment of an index portfolio 
when benchmarking buyout performance. 
Fourth, we build the portfolio of mimicking investments. As we explain in detail in the 
Appendix, the construction of the adequate of mimicking investments depends on several 
                                              
4 See e.g. Jensen (1989a), p. 64; Smith (1990), p. 154, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1987), Table 1, or Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989), p. 774. The lower end of the range of unlevered beta factors could also result from the selection of 
infrequently traded peers. We attempted to exclude this kind of peer from our selection. Our sensitivity analysis 
considers this case for its effect on our results.  
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assumptions. These assumptions are stressed in the subsequent sensitivity analyses and 
robustness checks. We start with our “base case” approach, and one of its important features is 
the replication of the limited liability for each buyout. Hence, the only available collateral for 
every individual mimicking investment is the portfolio of the S&P 500 shares which are bought 
on the margin. As a result, levering up the portfolio is possible only at the cost of a credit 
spread. As a source for the relevant spreads we refer to Altman and Pasternack (2006). 
However, borrowing is possible at the risk free rate. 
In our first sensitivity analysis, we relax this assumption and observe the consequences if 
lending is possible at the same credit spread, suggesting that investors can buy risky bonds and 
the S&P 500 portfolio. Subsequently, we abandon the establishment of limited liability for 
setting up the mimicking investments and allow both risk free borrowing and lending. The next 
sensitivity analysis replicates Kaplan and Schoar (2005), i.e., the mimicking investments time-
match the S&P 500 portfolio. The last sensitivity analysis replicates Phalippou and Gottschalg 
(2008), assuming for the unlevering/levering process initial debt/equity ratios of 3 and final 
debt/equity ratios at average industry levels, a corporate tax rate of 35%, a debt beta of 0.25 for 
the buyouts and 0 for the public market, and no differentiation between the risks of debt tax 
shields in the quoted and unquoted market segment. Further, risk-free borrowing and lending is 
possible in this case. 
The beta factors that result from our base case and the proposed sensitivity analyses are 
presented in Table 2 and the descriptive statistics as well as the check for appropriateness of the 
different mimicking approaches is presented in Table 3. 
Table 2 
Equity Betas for the Baseline Case and Four Scenarios 
This table presents the most important descriptive statistics of the S&P 500 equity beta factors 
at closing and at exit in our base scenario and in different sensitivity analyses 
 
   Closing  Exit 
# Scenario  0.05 
pct. 
0.95 
pct.  Mean Median  0.05 
pct. 
0.95 
pct.  Mean Median 
0 - 2  Base Cases  0.32  3.88  1.40  0.94  0.32  2.80  1.01  0.71 
3 Kaplan/Schoar  (2005)  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
4  Phalippou/Gottschalg 
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Table 3 
Descriptives of the Mimicking Portfolio Returns and Regression Results of the Scenarios 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the annualized rates of return of the mimicking 
investments, regression results and the test whether the mimicking model is applicable for our 
base case analysis and for different scenarios. 






































































































































































































0  Base Case  
9.07% 
(12.16)% 




0.034  0.195 
1  Base Case, but Borrowing and 
Lending at Altman Spreads 
10.30% 
(13.91%) 




0.032  0.173 
2  Base Case, but Borrowing and 
Lending at Risk Free Rate 
12.89% 
(12.59%) 




0.025  0.182 
3  Kaplan/Schoar (2005) 
12.36% 
(14.95%) 




0.055  0.287 
4  Phalippou/Gottschalg (2008) 
12.55% 
(12.60%) 




0.029  0.322 
 
To confirm the applicability of the mimicking approaches we test them like simple benchmark 
models, using the returns achieved in the buyout transactions as dependent variables and the 
returns of the mimicking investments as independent variables: 
ε α α ~ ~ ~




  Returns of the buyout cash flows 
Mimicking r ~
  Returns of the mimicking investments 
α0  Intercept of the regression 
α1  Slope of the regression 
ε ~
  White noise error term 
If our benchmark models are appropriate to explain the buyout returns, the slope α1 should be 
equal to one, while the intercept α0 is rather meaningless due to the assumed bias towards high 
buyout returns gross of fees and a high influence of white noise in this regression. Hence, we 
test the hypotheses: H0 → α1 = 1, H1 → α1 ≠ 1.  
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Our base case approach yields a mean average return of the mimicking investments of 9.07%, 
and the median is 12.16%. The 0.05 and the 0.95 percentile are -30.06%, and 38.25% 
respectively, while the standard deviation is 0.2525. In our base case approach, we assume that 
lending is possible at the risk free rate and borrowing at the cost of high yield debt. This 
adequately replicates the limited liability in buyouts. For a fair comparison, the investor 
mimicking the buyouts should not borrow on his other assets. As a consequence, the cost of 
borrowing to establish the mimicking portfolio increases to the level paid in the buyout 
transactions. Actually, the cost of the debt required to set up the mimicking transactions might 
even be larger than for the buyouts because buying stocks on the margin is very expensive. 
The test-result for applicability of our model is positive. The explained variance of 3.4% of the 
dependent variable is very little, but this is not surprising at the given high volatility of 
the buyout and the mimicking returns. The R
2 will remain small unfortunately, for all of the 
subsequent regressions. However, the regression slope 0.67 is different from zero with a p-value 
of 0.009, and not significantly different from 1 with a p-value of 0.195. As a consequence, the 
proposed model is adequate for benchmarking buyouts. 
In the first sensitivity analysis (# 1), we also apply the same credit spreads for lending. This 
leads to an increase of the mean (median) return of the mimicking investments to 10.30% 
(13.91% respectively). The whole distribution of mimicking returns is shifted towards positive 
results as would be expected. Ninety percent of the returns are between -29.50% and 38.92%, 
and the standard deviation of the returns remains almost unchanged at 0.2523. The regression 
confirms that this mimicking approach is also appropriate. 
In the next sensitivity analysis (# 2), we allow for risk-free borrowing and lending. The mean 
(median) mimicking return increases to 12.89% (12.59%) and the return distribution shifts 
further towards positive returns with the 0.05 percentile at -22.93% and the 0.95 percentile at 
45.75%. The standard deviation of returns slightly reduces to 0.2323 and the regression results 
signal applicability of that approach. 
For the first three scenarios, the beta factors to match in the public market do not change 
because we do not change any assumption regarding the unlevering/re-levering process for the 
buyouts; we only change assumptions that affect the mimicking portfolio. Next, we replicate 
Kaplan and Schoars’ (2005) findings (scenario #3), and set all beta factors equal to 1, hence, 
there is no borrowing and lending involved. This is in strong contrast to the betas in our 
baseline cases that vary substantially over time and across transactions. On average, the 
systematic risk of the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) mimicking portfolio is lower than 
the systematic risk in our case. We achieve a mean (median) 12.36% (14.95%) return of the 
mimicking transactions. The standard deviation of returns decreases to 0.1475 and this 
correspondingly narrows 90% of the return observations between -13.88% and 31.99%. The 
regression confirms that matching the buyouts with the S&P 500 directly is appropriate. 
In the final scenario (#4), we replicate Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008) and use their approach 
for the unlevering/levering process. Here, betas range between 0.32 (0.05 percentile) and 4.36 
(0.95 percentile) at closing with a mean average of 1.50 and a median of 1.03. The betas 
decrease until exit to a range between 0.32 (0.05 percentile) and 1.70 (0.95 percentile) with a 
mean of 0.82 and a median of 0.73. We find that equity betas are slightly larger at closing and 
slightly smaller at exit compared to our base case approach. Assuming risk-free borrowing 
and lending to adjust the mimicking investments leads to a mean return of 12.55% and a 
median of 12.60%. These results, and also the standard deviation of the returns of 0.2208, are 
close to scenario #2. The 0.05 to 0.95 percentile is -26.31% to 43.46%, and the regression 
analysis signals appropriateness of this approach.  
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The scenarios confirm that buyout opportunity cost of capital is largely determined by the 
assumptions on the appropriate cost of and the returns on debt to establish the mimicking 
investments. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) suggest time-matching the buyout investments with 
S&P 500 exposure. This approach needs no assumptions about the capital structure of the 
individual buyouts, nor about any unlevering and re-levering procedure, hence it does also not 
need any determination of the cost/return on debt to establish the mimicking investment. 
However, the approach implies that, on average, buyout companies correspond to the average 
of the companies that comprise the S&P 500 index with respect to their business risk, their 
leverage, and their cost of debt. Further, the approach implies that, on average, the buyout 
leverage ratios do not change over time, or more precisely, follow the pattern of the S&P 500 
companies. If these preconditions are accepted, time-matching S&P 500 investments represent 
the correct opportunity cost of capital for buyout transactions. 
However, we claim that buyout transactions do not usually happen in risky industries, and 
differ with regard to leverage ratios, leverage cost, and deleverage patterns from the “average” 
S&P 500 company. Hence, we claim that corrections are necessary to control for these 
differences and propose these corrections in the Appendix. The described procedure leads to a 
set of levered and unlevered purchases of the S&P 500 Index portfolio. For the establishment of 
the mimicking portfolio, we have to specify the cost and the risk of debt. The simplest case is to 
assume that debt is risk free and borrowing and lending is possible at the risk-free rate, which 
is scenario #2. As a result, we achieve an average opportunity cost of capital of 12.89% 
(median 12.59%) which is, in fact, slightly different from the mean average 12.36% (median 
14.95%) return in the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) case. The approach by Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2008) leads to 12.55% (median 12.60%) which is very close to our result. One could 
conclude that the mentioned differences with respect to operating risks, leverage ratios and 
cost, net out on average. Hence, proper adjustments are not required, and the S&P 500 may 
serve as a benchmark for buyouts, even if the large dispersion of returns suggest that every 
single buyout should be benchmarked with “its specific” opportunity cost of capital. 
However, results change if we include a credit spread for the establishment of the mimicking 
transactions as we do in our base line case and scenario #1. If we assume that the limited 
liability in buyouts is a valuable feature that shall also be replicated, the risk and the cost of 
debt will rise. The S&P 500 portfolio must be purchased on the margin. In practice, it is in fact 
doubtful that banks allow borrowed share purchases up to the risk-levels that we detect at 
closing of some buyout transactions. This underlines the necessity to choose a fair mimicking 
approach that controls for this issue. As a consequence, we introduce risky debt to lever up the 
investments into the S&P 500 index, and observe a strong decrease of the average return of the 
mimicking portfolio to 9.07% (median 12.16%). This decrease is not surprising at first sight, as 
positive returns of the index portfolio are eaten up by the cost of debt. However, there is 
another factor that explains the deterioration of the average return. This is the simple fact that 
some of the mimicking transactions default. Thereby, it is not the transactions with the largest 
initial leverages. It is those with “bad” market timing that would have defaulted in the public 
market. If we also allow for lending at the same rates, the average return of the mimicking 
transactions becomes 10.30% (median 13.91%). 
As a result, we claim that it is, first, not appropriate to use the unadjusted index portfolio as a 
benchmark. Second, adjusting for different operating and leverage risks requires certain 
specifications, as described in the Appendix. Third, a fair replication of buyouts with public 
market securities should consider the limited liability of the transactions that come at some 
cost: Buyout sponsors do not borrow on the buyout fund’s other assets; the target corporations  
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borrow on their own assets. Hence, the equivalent approach is to purchase stocks on the 
margin. 
 
In a next step, we control for our assumptions regarding the risk-adjustment process and 
analyze the influence of outliers on the calculations in robustness checks. 
a) Robustness Checks 
For all of our robustness checks, we assume riskless borrowing and lending when setting up the 
mimicking portfolio, for better comparison. However, we alter the assumptions for 
the unlevering/re-levering approach that determine the beta factors which have to be tracked in 
the public market. The resulting beta factors in the robustness checks, the returns, and the 
regression analyses are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 4 
Equity Betas for the Robustness Checks 
This table presents the most important descriptive statistics of the equity beta factors at closing 
and at exit of our robustness checks. 
 
   Closing  Exit 
#  Robustness Check  0.05 
pct. 
0.95 
pct.  Mean Median  0.05 
pct. 
0.95 
pct.  Mean Median 
1 Industry  Mix  0.35  1.46  0.78  0.70  0.35  1.46  0.78  0.70 
2 Leverage  Only  0.93  4.16  2.11  1.92  0.87  2.65  1.40  1.13 
3  Increased Operating Betas  0.45  5.87  2.22  1.70  0.43  3.90  1.50  1.09 
4 Risk  Free  Debt  0.69  6.39  2.57  1.99  0.47  3.88  1.53  1.07 
5  Reduced Operating Risk  0.24  2.35  0.83  0.45  0.24  1.95  0.66  0.44 
6  Increased Risk of Debt  0.32  3.36  1.19  0.72  0.32  2.68  0.92  0.65 
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Table 5 
Mean IRRs of the Mimicking Portfolios and Regression Results of Robustness Checks 
This table comprises the descriptive statistics of the annualized rates of return of the mimicking 
investments, regression results and the test whether the mimicking model is applicable for the 
robustness checks. 













































































































































































































0.046  0.262 
2 Leverage  Only 
17.72% 
(19.60%) 




0.049  0.327 
3  Increased Operating Risk 
15.70% 
(16.27%) 




0.031  0.004 
4 Risk  Free  Debt 
17.57% 
(18.13%) 




0.041  0.009 
5  Reduced Operating Risk 
10.11% 
(10.07%) 




0.022  0.876 
6  Increased Risk of Debt 
11.86% 
(11.65%) 




0.024  0.285 
7 Outliers  Dropped 
12.27% 
(12.01%) 




0.056  0.186 
 
 
The first robustness check (#1) controls for the industry mix. We apply the average equity beta 
factors of our peer groups directly to the mimicking investments without considering different 
degrees of leverage. This leads to partial risk adjustment as such a mimicking portfolio 
replicates the industry mix of our buyouts but fails to capture the effect of (additional or less) 
leverage. In other words, the buyouts are benchmarked with their public peers directly. The 
approach leads to equity betas between 0.35 (0.05 percentile) and 1.46 (0.95 percentile) that 
remain constant over the holding period. Their mean average is 0.78, and the median is 0.70. 
Thus, the betas are lower than both the market beta and that of our baseline case. This results 
in a mean (median) return of the mimicking portfolio of 10.12% (11.97%). The standard 
deviation of 0.1253 is the lowest of all of our different analyses, and this is mirrored in a 
narrowed 0.05 to 0.95 percentile, which is -11.95% to 27.86%. The regression proves the 
applicability of that approach. 
This robustness check underlines two important implications: the average peer group betas are 
smaller than one, signaling that buyout funds search for targets in less risky industries. Further, 
we see again that without taking into account leverage risks, the opportunity cost of buyouts 
become low, at least lower than in Kaplan and Schoar (2005).  
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In the second robustness check (#2), we examine the impact of leverage alone on returns. We 
set all the investments of the mimicking portfolio to have an unlevered beta of 0.84 (which is 
the unlevered beta factor of the S&P 500 Index). Here we draw on data provided by Bernado, 
Chowdhry and Goyal (2004), which determines unlevered beta factors for the Fama and French 
(1997) industry classification.
5 We then lever up each mimicking investment with the actual 
leverage of the corresponding buyout. This leads to a comparison of the buyouts with a 
levered- and time-matched investment in a hypothetically leverage-free public market index. 
This scenario adjusts for differences in leverage risk, but not for the impact of different 
operating risks in the chosen industries. 
The resulting betas range at closing from 0.93 (0.05 percentile) to 4.16 (0.95 percentile) with a 
mean average of 2.11 and a median of 1.92. At exit they are between 0.87 (0.05 percentile) and 
2.65 (0.95 percentile) with a mean of 1.40 and a median of 1.13. Thus the betas are larger, on 
average, than in our baseline case. This highlights once more the proposition that buyout fund 
managers search within low-risk industries. Corresponding with the higher beta factors, the 
mimicking portfolio yields a mean (median) return of 17.72% (19.60%). The standard deviation 
of returns becomes as high as 0.2653 and the 0.05 to 0.95 percentile is -24.83% to 56.21%. The 
regression signals appropriateness of the approach. 
The third robustness check (#3) controls for the sensitivity of our results with respect to the 
calculation of the operating betas for the peer group companies. Buyout transactions often take 
place in niche markets in which shares might be traded infrequently. As several studies have 
found, infrequently traded assets do not closely follow market movements (Fisher, 1966; Pogue 
and Solnik, 1974; Scholes and Williams, 1977; Schwert, 1977, and Dimson, 1979). As a result, 
the business risks of the target companies could be downward biased. Along the same lines, one 
could argue that our approach inherently leads to a lower risk boundary for the buyout 
transactions, as we use comparables transferred from the public market to the unquoted 
segment. Another reason to perform this check is that we might have miss-specified the risk of 
debt, of debt tax shields, or the applicable tax rate in our unlevering/re-levering approach (as 
described in the Appendix). 
Hence, we increase the operating risk of each of the investments in the mimicking portfolio 
arbitrarily by an arbitrary factor that corrects for a suspected 25% understatement of the 
operating betas in our calculations. Consequently, the resulting equity betas increase (in 
reference to our baseline case) within the range of 0.45 (0.05 percentile) to 5.87 (0.95 percentile) 
at closing, with a mean of 2.22 and a median of 1.70. At exit, they range from 0.43 
(0.05 percentile) to 3.90 (0.95 percentile) with a mean of 1.50 and a median of 1.09. 
As expected, the mean (median) return of the mimicking investments increases to 15.70% 
(16.27%). The standard deviation of returns becomes as high as 0.3501, which expands the 0.05 
to 0.95 percentile to -40.41% to 67.25%. However, the regression slope of 0.46 is significantly 
different from 1 at a p-value of 0.004. Hence, this seems not to be an appropriate 
benchmarking approach. 
In the following robustness check (#4), we control for the impact of the risk of debt. As 
explained in detail in the Appendix, we use a debt beta of 0.41 in our base case analysis to 
lever-up the buyout betas. In this check, we instead replicate our calculations using risk-free 
debt. When no risk can be transferred to the lenders, all the leverage risk is borne by the equity 
                                              
5 See Bernado, Chowdhry and Goyal (2004), Table 1, panel C, means of 1978-2002 data column.  
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sponsors, and therefore, the equity betas for our mimicking transactions increase substantially. 
They range at closing from 0.69 (0.05 percentile) to 6.39 (0.95 percentile), with a mean of 2.57 
and a median of 1.99. At exit they range from 0.47 (0.05 percentile) to 3.88 (0.95 percentile), 
with a mean of 1.53 and a median of 1.07 respectively.  
Accordingly, the mean (median) return of the mimicking investments rises to peaking 17.57% 
(18.13%). These peaks are mirrored by the dispersion of returns. The standard deviation 
becomes 0.3534, and 90% of the returns are between -42.13% and 72.35%. One can conclude 
that if buyout sponsors are not able to transfer risks to the lenders, the appropriate opportunity 
cost of capital becomes very large and dispersed. However, the assumption that lenders in 
buyout transactions to not take risks is rather hypothetical. Additionally, the regression results 
suggest that assuming risk-free buyout debt is not appropriate when benchmarking buyouts: 
The slope of 0.53 is significantly different from one at the 0.009 level. 
The next robustness check (#5) follows Kaplan and Stein (1990), and we assume that operating 
improvements have lowered operating risk. A reduction of operating risks might, for example, 
be caused by improved governance by the active investors. Thus, we (arbitrarily) reduce all the 
operating beta factors by 25%. This reduction of operating beta factors could also be justified 
by an overestimation of the risk of investment-grade debt, and an underestimation of the 
corporate tax rate while initially calculating the operating beta factors. However, this also leads 
to a lower truncation level for the risk of debt and hence lower levered mimicking investments 
(see the Appendix). Accordingly, the beta factors for this scenario shrink to between 0.24 (0.05 
percentile) and 2.35 (0.95 percentile), with a mean (median) of only 0.83 (0.45) at closing. They 
decrease to a range between 0.24 (0.05 percentile) to 1.95 (0.95 percentile), with a mean 
(median) at 0.66 (0.44). 
Due to the resulting low beta factors the mean (median) return of the mimicking investments is 
only 10.11% (10.07%). The standard deviation is also low at 0.1468, while 90% of the return 
distribution is between -16.07% and 31.51%. The regression slope is 0.93 and hence close to 
one. This confirms the applicability of this approach, and turns to its discussion: If buyout 
sponsors are indeed able to lower the operating risks of their portfolio companies by enhanced 
governance or restructuring activities, they likewise decrease their opportunity cost of capital. 
Improved governance by the active investor is named in Jensen (1989a and 1989b), Kaplan 
(1989a and 1989b), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Smith (1990), and Kaplan (1991) as a 
particular determinant in buyout transactions. Hence, these improvements should be accounted 
for in buyout performance analyses. 
In our sixth robustness check we analyze what happens if lenders take on an even higher 
proportion of risk than that assumed in our baseline case. This assumption is also reasonable as 
high yield bonds or mezzanine funding is often extensively used to structure buyout 
transactions. It is also consistent with prior research that found even higher debt betas for 
buyouts (such as Kaplan and Stein (1990)). Hence, we arbitrarily increase our debt beta to 0.50 
to lever up the mimicking investments. 
The resulting equity betas range from 0.32 (0.05 percentile) to 3.36 (0.95 percentile) at closing, 
with a mean of 1.19 and a median of 0.72. At exit, the betas range from 0.32 (0.05 percentile) 
to 2.68 (0.95 percentile), with a mean of 0.92 and a median of 0.65. As more risk is transferred 
to the lenders, the mean (median) return of the mimicking investments decreases (compared to 
our base case analysis) to 11.86% (11.65%). The standard deviation of returns is 0.2106 and the 
0.05 – 0.95 interval ranges from -22.47% to 41.21%. The regression slope of 0.67 is not  
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significantly different from one. This leads us to conclude that the opportunity cost of capital of 
buyout transactions becomes smaller if we assume that GPs are able to structure buyout 
transactions transferring a substantial part of the transaction risk to the lenders. This is a 
common feature in buyout transactions where debt layers are often provided against 
insufficient or no collateral. 
In the final robustness check we exclude those transactions from our sample that could be 
considered “atypical” or outliers of other buyout transaction. Even with full data regarding the 
transactions, some would be characterized by relatively low or zero leverage ratios, minority 
ownership of the active investor, or either very short, or long holding periods. Hence, we 
exclude transactions from our sample with a debt/equity ratio below 0.25 and where the 
institutional investors’ equity ownership is below 50%. We further exclude transactions with 
holding periods below a year and above nine years. Finally, we exclude the most successful 
transactions with achieved internal rates of return above 200% p.a. This results in a reduced 
sample of 108 transactions. The equity betas then range between 0.31 (0.05 percentile) and 3.89 
(0.95 percentile) at closing, with a mean of 1.32 and a median of 0.91. At exit, the betas range 
from 0.31 (0.05 percentile) to 3.12 (0.95 percentile) with a mean (median) of 1.01 (0.70). The 
mimicking portfolio yields a mean (median) return of 12.27% (12.01%) which is slightly lower 
than in our baseline case, assuming borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate. The standard 
deviation of returns is 0.2290, while the 0.05 to 0.95 interval is from -21.96% to 45.37%. The 
regression slope of 0.70 is not significantly different from one. Hence, dropping “outliers” from 
our sample of transactions does not meaningfully change the results. 
b) Sample Selection Bias 
To analyze the extent of a sample selection bias with respect to the success of the transactions, 
we first study the impact of fees on the returns of our sample buyouts, and recalculate the 
internal rates of return achieved in the buyout transactions after deducting carried interest. 
Therefore, we assume expensive GPs, charging 30% carried interest at a hurdle rate of 0%. The 
average (median) internal rate of return of our sample transactions reduces from 50.08% to 
35.50% (median from 35.70% to 27.85%). These were the average (median) IRRs achieved by 
investors if management fees were already paid. However, the management fees lower the 
amount of money available for investments, no matter if paid on committed or invested capital. 
Phalippou (2009) argues that a typical buyout fund charges the equivalent of 7 percent fees per 
year. This calculation includes management fees, and carried interest, among other fee 
components. His analyses are based on committed capital and not invested. For our 
transactions, we only know how much money was invested but not how much was committed. 
Metrick and Yasuda (2008) provide an illustrative example where total management fees add up 
to 14.81% of nominal invested funds.
6 Hence, we can correct for this discount and appreciate 
the cash outflows from the investors by 100/86.23. This simplifying calculation leads to a mean 
(median) IRR of 25.92% (23.59%). Hence, the average internal rates of return after fees achieved 
in our buyout sample transactions are somehow higher than, for example, those reported by 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008), or Phalippou (2009). 
A bias towards higher returns earned in our sample transactions does not harm our results as 
long as the achieved returns are independent of the parameters that determine the mimicking 
                                              
6 This is total management fees of $12.77 divided by invested capital $86.23 per $100 committed, according to the 
numbers Metrick and Yasuda (2008) provide.  
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investment. Therefore, we search for correlations between the IRRs achieved in the buyout 
transactions; and all determinants necessary to set up the mimicking portfolio. We find four 
significant correlations at the two-tailed 0.05 significance level: Achieved IRRs correlate 
positively with the degree of leverage at closing (ρ = 0.204), with debt redemption abilities (ρ = 
0.556), with the peer group’s average beta factor (ρ = 0.211), and negatively with the holding 
period (ρ = -0.335). Hence, as our sample is biased towards higher IRRs it might likewise be 
biased towards highly levered transactions, target corporations with strong free cash flows, 
risky peers, and short holding periods. However, we also verify if these parameters drive the 
returns of the mimicking portfolio in parallel. We find that only the initial degree of leverage (ρ 
= 0.240) likewise positively affects buyout opportunity cost of capital. 
We conclude that our sample might be biased towards highly levered transactions, and this 
increases the average opportunity cost of capital. Unfortunately, we cannot correct for this bias 
because initial leverage ratios are unknown for the population of buyouts. However, our 
observations are in line with the samples used by other researchers, such as DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1987), Kaplan and Stein (1990 and 1993), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), and 
Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2007). Anyway, if we include too many highly 
levered transactions in our sample, the returns of the mimicking investments increase. 
Therefore, our calculations of opportunity costs of capital for buyout transactions represent 
upper estimates - and this does not harm the following overall conclusions. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we contribute to the discussion of how to determine opportunity cost of capital 
for buyout transactions. For a set of 133 United States buyouts between 1984 and 2004, we 
propose a portfolio of levered mimicking investments in the S&P 500 Index that match the 
buyouts with respect to the timing of their cash flows and their systematic risks. An approach 
like ours had not previously been used due to the non-availability of required data for the 
determination of the buyouts’ systematic risks. With our rich data set, we show that using the 
returns of the S&P 500 (or any other benchmark index) as opportunity cost of capital for 
buyout performance analyses only yields preliminary results. The risk pattern in buyout 
transactions is different from the public benchmark index. Usually, buyout transactions happen 
in less than average risky industries. Contrarily, they are levered up at closing to an extent that 
exceeds the risk of the market proxy. However, over the holding period this risk is reduced by 
amortization payments. Further, limited partners themselves do not borrow money to lever up 
their transactions. The required debt is borrowed by the target corporations, and the fund’s 
liability is limited to its equity exposure. As a result, borrowing at the risk-free rate is a highly 
unrealistic assumption, when setting up a public market mimicking investment. We show that 
taking into account these issues leads to average (median) opportunity cost of capital which are 
3.29% (2.79%) below the mean average (median) of the S&P 500 returns. The average/median 
opportunity cost of capital of buyouts is ex post lower than the benchmark index due to the 
simple fact that if our sample of buyouts was appropriately mimicked in the public market, 
many of the transactions would have defaulted. However, it is not the most levered transactions 
that default - it is simply those transactions that are badly timed in the public market. A 
potential bias in our sample towards highly levered transactions does not affect this result 
because high leverage ratios affect the mimicking returns positively, hence, in the opposite 
direction. If we assume that borrowing and lending is possible at the risk-free rate to set up the 
mimicking investments, the mean buyout opportunity cost of capital becomes close to the result  
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by Kaplan and Schoar (2005). However, there still remains a difference of 2.36% regarding the 
median returns of both distributions. The standard deviation of returns remains much higher, 
again comparing our approach and Kaplan and Schoar (2005). As a result, we claim that 
buyouts should not be “averaged” for performance analyses. On the contrary, a comprehensive 
discussion of the inherent risks caused by the business and applied leverage ratios is necessary 
when judging buyout success. The discussion includes the question of how much risk is taken 
by lenders in these transactions, whether risks might be decreased due to improved governance, 
and what credit-spreads have to be paid when levering up the public market equivalent. 
Our study builds on and extends existing work on the comparison of public and private equity 
performance in several respects: 
First, we propose a method for benchmarking the asset class that might become an industry 
standard. 
Second, our study exploits the detailed information available on a large sample of individual 
buyouts to illustrate the importance of a detailed risk-adjustment for assessment of their 
performance. Using precise information on the valuations of individual target companies, their 
competitors, as well as their industry sector and on the capital structures of the investment 
vehicles at the closing date and at exit, it becomes possible to attribute operating and leverage 
risk measures to each individual transaction. Thus, we can comprehensively control for the 
transaction risks in constructing a well-defined mimicking portfolio with an equal risk profile. 
The sensitivity analyses highlight the importance of a comprehensive risk-adjustment that 
considers both operating and leverage risks for an accurate assessment of buyout performance. 
This is directly relevant for interpreting findings from prior research where this kind of risk 
separation has not been possible. 
Third, our study provides detailed insights into the importance of different assumptions 
regarding the risk-profile of debt, debt tax shields, credit spreads and transaction operational 
risks. The analyses confirm the conjecture that buyout investors choose industries with low 
operating risk, use financial leverage where favorable, and transfer an important portion of the 
risk to the lenders. 
Absent detailed data on the risk characteristics of the entire universe of buyout transactions, 
any assessment of the relative performance of buyouts has to remain inconclusive. The detected 
differences regarding the distributions of returns in our base case analysis, and the scenarios 
and robustness checks are large. Researchers should thoroughly specify their presumptions with 
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Appendix 
Constructing the Mimicking Portfolio 
 
We take the perspective of a well diversified investor not exposed to idiosyncratic risks of the 
particular buyout transactions. Accordingly, timing and equity betas of the mimicking strategy 
have to correspond to those of the buyout transactions. To track the transactions, we construct 
an index portfolio and allow funds to be borrowed or lent. We assume that borrowing and 
lending is possible in unlimited amounts. However, the assumptions regarding the risks taken 
by lenders and different rates for borrowing and lending largely determine the returns of the 
mimicking investments. In our base case, we assume that lenders take risk and receive 
appropriate compensation. Contrarily, if the mimicking investment includes unlevering the 
index portfolio, funds are lent at the risk-free rate. In the course of robustness checks, we stress 
these assumptions to investigate the effect of credit spreads, and change the risk borne by 
lenders. We use the total return calculations for the S&P 500 Index, provided by DataStream as 
the performance benchmark. This index assumes that dividends are reinvested, which 
accurately reflects the fact that, during buyout transactions, dividends are not usually paid but 
free cash flows are used for debt redemption. However, if there is a notable premature 
disbursement, it is considered. The exact approach to tracking the individual buyout 
transactions is described in the following. 
a) Framework 
For the theoretical background for our mimicking strategies we refer to Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), assuming that every company is exposed to some unavoidable and constant economic 
risk by its business. This risk has to be borne by the investors of a company. If a company is 
fully equity financed, the investors are directly exposed to that risk. If debt financing is used, 
risk is allocated to the equity investors and the debt providers according to ratios discussed 
below. For the purpose of our analysis, the constant risk class assumption means that a risk 
class shall be attributed to every target company defined by the operating risk of its public 
peers. This assumption merits discussion in general,
7 but especially regarding buyouts. There, 
efforts are often made by management teams to reduce operating risks, e.g., by focusing on 
safer (i.e., less volatile) business strategies.
8 However, we cannot correct for this kind of risk 
class transition because, first, we do not have sufficient information about the strategic 
activities of the target companies after closing; and second, we would be unable to assess how 
the activities had influenced the companies’ business risk. For these reasons, we base our 
approach on the assumption of unchanging risk classes. 
                                              
7 For early discussions of the constant risk class hypothesis refer to Ball and Brown (1967), who argue that, 
according to some typical ratios, different risk classes can be attributed to enterprises. Gonedes (1969) tests the 
constant risk class assumption. He finds some support to refute the hypothesis. Sharpe and Cooper (1972) investigate 
risk classes at the New York Stock Exchange and find evidence for the existence of constant risk classes. 
8 Some evidence that target companies focus on less risky businesses after buyouts close is provided by Hite and 
Vetsuypens (1989), p. 959; Kaplan (1989a), p. 224; Lehn and Poulsen (1989), p. 776; Marais, Schipper, and Smith 
(1989), p. 167; Asquith and Wizman (1990), p. 197; Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), p. 1398; Palepu (1990), p. 248; 
Smith (1990), p. 145; Opler (1992), p. 28; Holthausen and Larcker (1996), p. 328; Bae and Simet (1998), p. 159; Elitzur, 
Halpern, Kierschnick, and Rotenberg (1998), p. 352; Nohel and Tarhan (1998), p. 197; Cotter and Peck (2001), p. 105; 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), p. 127, and Bruton, Keels, and Scifres (2002), p. 713. The operating risk is thereby 
generally expressed by the steadiness of operating earnings or by the ratio between fixed costs and variable costs.  
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There are also practical reasons to assume constant risk classes since it is practically impossible 
to identify adequate peer group companies and obtain the necessary data for the time our 
sample transactions actually took place. Hence, we perform all the calculations for the 
business-class risks with present data. Therefore the peers’ weekly stock prices and annual 
balance sheet data between 1999 and 2003 are used. The results are then transferred to the time 
of the actual transaction. In this way, we assume that typical business-class risks remain 
constant even over a very long time horizon. 
1. Unlevering the Peer Groups’ Business Class Risks 
Since buyout transactions often occur in very particular niche markets, we do not want to rely 
on broad industry definitions to classify our sample transactions. Rather, we aim to be as 
precise as possible assigning peer groups to our 133 sample companies and identifying their 
116 different industry sectors. Some of the transactions were made simply in the same business. 
For these industry sectors we determine peer groups of quoted comparable companies. A peer 
group is defined by an equal four-digit SIC code and by company headquarters in the United 
States. For some transactions, the principal competitors are named in the documents, thus 
facilitating the peer group analysis. The majority of the peers however, are defined by the 
description of the relevant market and the target companies’ products/services. This approach 
leads to suitable peer group samples. An advantage of focusing on buyout transactions is that 
reasonably comparable quoted companies usually exist. The accuracy of the peer group 
selection is qualitatively verified by comparing the major business units and products of the 
peers and the targets. As an additional filter we require the peer companies to be traded 
regularly. 
We decided that, in order to be meaningful, a peer group has to consist of at least three 
companies. For a few buyouts, we find more than 20 peer group members. In these cases, we 
narrow the search by including an appropriate company size in terms of market capitalization. 
We eliminate those companies from the peer group that are out of the range of 50% to 200% of 
the equity value of the target. We are aware that this approach excludes non-successful 
competitors with low market capitalization that might face operating difficulties or even 
bankruptcy. However, this is in line with our basic assumption of not incorporating non-
systematic risk such as bankruptcy. Finally, we identify 1,207 peers to be incorporated into our 
analysis. 
We measure the business class risks for our transactions by a market-weighted average of the 
unlevered beta factors of the relevant peer group companies. To gain these beta factors, we 
calculate the actual levered beta factors of every single peer-group company using the S&P 500 
Index as a benchmark and weekly returns from January 1999 to December 2003. To unlever 
these beta factors, we determine leverage ratios of the companies during the same time from 
balance sheet and market data obtained from DataStream. Therefore we net total debt of each 
period (which includes short- and long-term interest bearing debt) by cash positions and divide 
it by the year-end market capitalizations (of straight and preferred equity). Finally, we 
determine the arithmetic average over the periods. Thus, we assume that the nominal value of 
balance sheet debt equals its market value. This implies that the beta factors reflect current 
leverage ratios, but do not anticipate them.  Once we determined  the  arithmetic average of the   
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leverage ratios we use a beta transformation formula to derive the hypothetical beta factor for 
the company without any debt. Such a formula has to consider the role of the tax benefit of 
debt financing (the tax savings that result from deducting interest from taxable earnings). In 
the simplest case where debt is perpetual and risk free, the interest expense can always be fully 
deducted from the taxable earnings, and the tax rate and the interest rate do not change, the 
capitalized value of the tax shield simplifies to τD.
9  
While, in general, the assumption of unchanging risk classes has to be accepted, the postulate 
of debt being risk free should be stressed for our analysis to allow for real market conditions, 
such as credit risk on corporate bonds. Mandelker and Rhee (1984) present how operating 







d  systematic risk borne by debt providers (debt beta) 
β
e  systematic risk borne by equity investors (levered equity beta) 
β
u  systematic operating risk (unlevered beta) 
τ  marginal tax rate 
D  market value of debt (all tax-deductible sources of capital such as senior, subordinated 
and mezzanine debt) 
E  market value of equity (common and preferred) 
 
Having calculated a debt beta factor β
d (which is discussed later), and fixed the marginal tax 
rate at 35%,
11 we can calculate the unlevered beta factor for every single peer-group company 
applying its average debt-to-equity ratio. Finally, we determine the market capitalization 
weighted average of the unlevered beta factors of all the companies of a peer group. We refer to 
this as our measure for the systematic operating risk of the target companies.
12 
                                              
9 This was originally derived by Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963), first empirically tested by Hamada (1972) 
and transferred into the CAPM by Rubinstein (1973). Refer to Drees and Eckwert (2000) for a critique of this 
approach. 
10 See Mandelker and Rhee (1984), Equation (3) and Footnote 2. 
11 See Graham (2000). 
12 A comprehensive discussion regarding degrees of operating and financial leverages and the implications on 
operating and equity beta factors is lead by Hamada (1972), Gonedes (1973), Lev (1974), Beaver and Manegold 
(1975), Hill and Stone (1980), Gahlon and Gentry (1982), Frecka and Lee (1983), Huffman (1983), Mandelker and 
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2. Levering Up the Individual Transactions 
Formula (2) reflects the assumption that uncertainty regarding the company’s ability to gain the 
tax benefits from debt financing is best measured by the rate at which its creditors lend the 
money. This is the cost of debt r
d. As long as the leverage ratios are moderate, this seems to be 
the correct relationship between the systematic operating risk and the risk borne by the 
shareholders and lenders. If leverage ratios increase, the company may be unable to realize the 
tax benefits either fully or partially, simply because it does not generate sufficient income and 
will be unable to carry losses forward.
13 The risk of not being able to fully profit from debt 
finance is then as high as the risk of obtaining the income itself (the operating systematic risk). 
Then, the more appropriate rate for discounting the tax benefits equals the unlevered cost of 
capital.
14 The operating company risk is then borne by the equity and debt investors according 
to the following relationship:
15 
   
(3)  
 
We assume that, for the publicly quoted companies of our peer groups, the degrees of leverage 
are moderate and, therefore, the tax benefits are discounted by the cost of debt. We follow 
Kaplan and Ruback’s (1995) argument regarding buyout transactions and capitalize the tax 
benefits by the operating cost of capital. Hence, we make use of Formula (3). This approach is 
based principally on two typical features of buyout transactions. First, on average, the amount 
of debt used in initiating a buyout leads to leverage ratios far higher than the average debt-to-
equity ratios of quoted companies.
16 This results in a higher risk association with tax shields 
because the companies might not achieve enough income to fully benefit from the tax-
deductible interest payments. Second, attempts are usually made to redeem debt levels as 
quickly as possible. Therefore, it is common to liquidate assets and to use free cash flows for 
debt service.
17 This leads to uncertain future debt levels that depend on the future free cash 
flows and, hence, the uncertainty about future interest payments (as well as the tax benefits) is 
as high as the uncertainty about the operating business. 
As discussed, the resulting equity beta factors are influenced by the assumption regarding the 
risk of achieving the future tax shields. Since some transactions in our sample have lower debt 
levels and  therefore  higher  probabilities of benefiting from tax shields, it could be argued that  
                                              
13 See Modigliani and Miller (1963), Footnote 5. 
14 See the discussions about this topic in Myers (1974), p. 22; Riener (1985), p. 231; Myers and Ruback (1987), p. 9; 
Kaplan and Ruback (1995), p. 1062; Arzac (1996), p. 42, and Graham (2000), p. 1917. 
15 See Ruback (2002), Equation 34. 
16 See De Angelo, De Angelo, and Rice (1984), p. 373; Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989), p. 159; Kaplan and Stein 
(1993), Table 3; Cotter and Peck (2001), p. 105; Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2007), Table 6, and 
our Table 1. 
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Formula (2) is more appropriate at least for some of the transactions. Further, it could be argued 
that, in accordance with Kaplan (1989b), the tax benefits of buyout transactions are most 
meaningful to investors. Thus the investors ensure that the risk of receiving the tax benefits is 
rather low and, therefore, Formula (2) would again be the more appropriate to lever up the beta 
factors for the buyout transaction. Since both arguments seem rich, we consider both 
approaches in the sensitivity analysis, varying the resulting beta factors. 
Again, after having specified the systematic risk of debt β
d (as described in the following 
section), we can calculate the equity betas for every single buyout and adjust them annually for 
the redemption abilities of the target companies. This provides ex post equity beta transition 
patterns between closing and exit for the individual transactions. 
3. Deriving Debt Betas 
We next need to specify the systematic risk of debt in order to be able to lever and unlever the 
systematic equity risk according to Formulas (2) and (3). We distinguish between the 
moderately levered publicly traded companies and the (in general) more highly levered buyout 
transactions. An adequate measure of the systematic risk of the debt layers of the quoted 
companies would be provided by the beta factor of investment grade debt. Due to different 
maturities and decreasing durations and, therefore, decreasing volatility over time, it is not 
clear which bonds would be best suited to measuring systematic debt risk.
18 This problem is 
exacerbated when calculating a risk proxy for the buyout debt. Therefore low grade/high yield 
bonds would be the benchmark. These bonds usually have larger coupon payments, and are 
called, converted or defaulted more frequently than investment grade bonds.
19 This leads to the 
problem that, on average, the duration and, hence, the volatility, might be even lower than for 
investment grade bonds.
20  
We follow Cornell and Green (1991) and calculate average debt beta factors from the price data 
of open-end bond funds. This resolves the issue of lacking price data on low-grade bonds, 
defaults, calls, and conversions. We retrieve weekly gross-returns and 2004 year-end market 
capitalizations for 314 open-end funds investing in investment-grade corporate debt and we 
retrieve the same data for 101 open-end bond funds investing in low-grade debt securities.
21 
Using the S&P 500 Index as a market proxy over a two-year horizon, we calculate the beta 
factors for each fund. We then determine the market capitalization weighted average for the 
investment grade and for the high yield samples. For the investment grade sample, we 
determined a debt beta factor of 0.296 and of 0.410 for the high yield sample. Since the risk 
profile of our sample transactions is highly dependent on the assessment of the debt betas, we 
will perform a sensitivity analysis and include other research results on debt beta calculations. 
                                              
18 See Fisher and Weil (1971), Boquist, Racette, and Schlarbaum (1975), Lanstein and Sharpe (1978), p. 657; 
Livingston (1978) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1979). 
19 See Altman (1989), p. 913; Asquith, Mullins, and Wolff (1989), p. 928, and Blume, Keim, and Patel (1989), 
published (1991). 
20 See Cornell and Green (1991), p. 47. 
21 Data was retrieved from Bloomberg.  
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Blume, Keim, and Patel (1991) directly calculate betas with the S&P 500 for different periods 
using Scholes and Williams’ (1977) and OLS-regressions of returns on government bonds and 
on low-grade bonds with at least ten years to maturity. They find beta factors for the 
government bonds ranging between 0.16 and 0.83 and betas for the low-grade bonds of 
between 0.32 and 0.71 (less than the maximum of the government bonds!). Cornell and Green 
(1991) report debt betas for different bond risk classes and periods using bond fund returns. 
Their investment-grade debt betas range from 0.19 to 0.25 and their high-yield betas range 
from 0.29 to 0.54. 
Kaplan and Stein (1990) determine implied debt betas for a sample of 12 leveraged 
recapitalizations of publicly quoted companies. They calculate equity beta factors before and 
after the transactions and provide the implied debt betas under two different assumptions. In 
this way, they use three different estimation models. With their first assumption, that operating 
risks do not change, they find that the equity betas rise surprisingly little, between 37% and 
57% on average (depending on which method is used to estimate them). This leads to average 
(median) implied debt beta factors of 0.65 (0.62) for all debt layers of the individual 
transactions, such as senior and junior debt. Their second assumption is that the operating beta 
factor is reduced by approximately 25%. This reduction is linked to the market-adjusted 
premium paid at the recapitalization, which could represent an anticipation of decreased fixed 
costs. In this case, the corresponding average (median) implied systematic debt risk is 0.40 
(0.35). The method developed by Kaplan and Stein (1990) also offers an alternative way of 
calculating reduced operating beta factors. If a fixed beta factor for the debt is inserted into 
their model, a hypothetical reduced operating beta factor can be calculated. They refer to 
Blume, Keim, and Patel (1989) who provide beta factors for low-grade bonds during different 
time periods, and use 0.25 as the debt providers’ systematic risk for the relevant period.
22 This 
results in an average reduction of operating betas by 41%. Kaplan and Stein (1990) argue that 
their research should be best considered as yielding ranges of risk, rather than a single estimate. 
Following their reasoning, the above-cited information on debt betas will be addressed in our 
sensitivity analysis, where we vary the risk of debt. Also, in a few cases then, the debt betas are 
larger than the calculated unlevered betas of the target companies. Since equity claims (as 
residual claims) must be at least as risky as debt claims, we always truncate the risks of debt at 
the levels of the operating risks. This assumes that, in the less risky transactions, debt and 
equity investors bear the same (low) risk. 
b) Treatment of the Individual Transactions 
Each transaction is analyzed thoroughly in terms of the timing and the character of the 
underlying cash flows. Our data provides us with the dates and payments at closing and at exit 
and for add-on investments and premature distributions. Likewise, principle claims linked to 
the equity and debt cash flows are recorded. For our analysis, common and preferred equity are 
treated as equivalent. Similarly, all debt is treated as straight debt. Unfortunately, lacking 
information about the structure of claims, we cannot differentiate rankings or collateral for 
particular debt layers. We assume that all buyout fund investments are equity investments 
unless they are  explicitly declared  as higher  ranking  properly collateralized debt instruments.  
                                              
22 See Blume, Keim, and Patel (1989), published (1991), Table V.  
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This approach considers the fact that investments by a buyout fund can usually be regarded as 
equity investments in terms of their inherent risk. Even if investments are structured as debt 
(e.g., shareholder loans), their economic character and risk differs from that of loans. They are 
usually of a junior rank and are unaccompanied by substantial collateral, thus making all 
investments resemble equity. All remaining layers other than common or preferred equity 
provided by third parties are treated as debt. 
To build the mimicking portfolio we attribute the same systematic risk as that of the buyout 
transactions to the mimicking cash flows. The systematic risk for buyout investors consists of 
the two elements of operating risk and leverage risk. For the operating risks, we use the peer 
group operating betas as proxies. The leverage risk is determined by the individual transaction 
structure adopted (and subsequently changed) in the buyout transaction. We know all cash 
flows from and to investors within the buyout and we know the capital structures for the entry 
and the exit dates. With this data, we can calculate the initial leverage ratios and the ratios at 
exit. Between closing and exit we assume that the leverages change linearly. Kaplan (1989a) 
finds evidence for asset sales and immediate reduction of the degree of leverage following the 
closing of buyout transactions. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) and Opler (1992) report 
decreasing investments after closing, while Zahra (1995) cites lower R&D expenditure. Their 
results are compatible with the buyout strategy of focusing on core businesses and improving 
operations and organization during the holding period. From their findings we conclude that 
the typical buyout deleveraging pattern should be hyperbolic rather than linear but, given the 
absence of parameters for estimating a hyperbolic function, we retain the linearity assumption. 
In order to determine a transaction’s risk structure we must differentiate between two general 
outcomes. First, the investment was successfully exited, providing us with the company 
valuation, the equity payoff, and hence the degree of leverage at exit. These transactions will be 
referred to as “non write-offs”. Second, the investment was written off (“write-offs”). We assign 
different assumptions regarding the leverage linearity to both outcomes. The “non write-offs” 
are entered and exited at certain leverage ratios. During the holding period the leverage ratio 
either decreases (as in most cases), it grows linearly or stays constant. The “write-offs” are 
entered into at a given degree of leverage and, by definition, are written off at an infinitely 
large leverage ratio. This is because the equity value approaches zero while the debt is usually 
somehow collateralized and therefore retains some value. This leads to problems in terms of the 
mimicking strategies, because it implies the unrealistic need to leverage investments in public 
market securities to an infinite exposure. Therefore, we refer to the cause of bankruptcy and 
assume that the investment was written off because covenants were breached and debt 
providers claimed their rights. In most cases, this should explain the loss of invested capital. 
With this reasoning, one can argue that the targeted leverage ratios, defined by loan contracts 
and covenants, could not be maintained. The debt providers in buyouts usually do not allow 
their risk to be increased. On the contrary, they insist on debt redemption. For us, this leads us 
to keep leverage risk constant in the mimicking position over the total holding period of the 
“write off” buyout transactions. As the leverage ratios could not be successfully lowered, and 
banks would not allow them to be increased, this appears to be the most rational treatment 
of them.  The approach is further supported by accounting guidelines and best practice rules for  
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buyout funds to immediately write off investments once substantial changes in value such as a 
breach of covenant takes place.
23 
In the simplest case without add-on investments and premature disbursements, the cash flows 
can then be duplicated by a single payment at closing and a single payoff at exit. The initial 
payment takes place at a certain systematic risk level characterized by the operating risk and 
the additional leverage risk. The systematic risk level at closing is determined by the initial 
equity beta of the corresponding buyout. The mimicking strategy is structured by investing the 
same amount of equity in the S&P 500 Index portfolio and levering it up according to 
Formula 3 with borrowed funds to achieve an equal systematic risk. If the equity beta of the 
buyout is lower than one, funds are lent. We assume that the buyouts are settled on the last 
trading day of the proposed month. The systematic risk of the mimicking strategy is adjusted 
each year until exit, to secure parity with the buyout. Therefore, the mimicking portfolio is 
liquidated every year, interest on debt is paid, debt is redeemed and the residual equity is 
invested in the S&P 500 Index portfolio being levered to the prevailing systematic risk. Again, 
if the prevailing beta factor is lower than one, funds are lent. In our base case, we assume that 
(infinite) lending is possible at the one-year United States treasury-bill rate and that the debt 
beta is 0 in Formula 3 while the unlevered beta is set equal to 1, the beta factor of the market 
proxy. However, (infinite) borrowing is associated with higher borrowing cost. The debt beta 
becomes 0.41, the beta of high yield debt, and the required debt needed to adjust for the buyout 
beta increases compared to risk free debt. As a reference for the appropriate credit spreads we 
use Figure 23 in Altman and Pasternack (2006), who provide credit spreads for high yield 
securities for the relevant period. The rationale for keeping lending risk free but borrowing 
risky is to replicate the limited liability of the buyout sponsor. The mimicking investor also 
must not allow his other assets to serve as collateral for the mimicking transaction. Hence, the 
remaining collateral is the equity investment in the index portfolio itself, which is bought on 
the margin. In the sensitivity analyses and robustness checks, we address the debt betas and the 
corresponding cost to determine our model’s sensitivity. The performance of the benchmark 
portfolio is measured by a total return index calculation on the S&P 500 corporations provided 
by DataStream. The risk adjustment procedure is repeated until the exit date. The final payoff of 
the mimicking strategy and the initial equity investment determine the return of the mimicking 
investment. If the residual equity of a mimicking investment approaches zero at any time 
within the holding period, the position is closed and the internal rate of return is calculated up 
to that point. 
c) The Treatment of Add-on Investments and Premature Payoffs 
To consider add-on investments by the funds and premature payoffs to the funds, we need to 
know the amounts and the investment dates. For the “non write-offs” we simply extrapolate the 
equity beta at the time of either the add-on investments or the early disbursements. Provided 
that the payments are not accompanied by changes in debt, they immediately affect the 
leverage ratios and then follow the same risk pattern as the initial investments. Since we have 
details of neither the company valuations, nor  the  prevailing  leverage ratios at the time of the  
                                              
23 See e.g. EVCA (2003).  
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add-on investments or disbursements, we cannot correct for the “leverage-jumps”. 
We implement add-on  investments  and disbursements in  our  linearity approach. The add-on 
investments are reflected by the degrees of leverage at exit and, hence, are incorporated into 
the transactions’ final risk levels. This approach might smooth the overall risk patterns. 
However, if the equity add-on is accompanied by debt in the same proportion as the prevailing 
capital structure at that time, this approach should hold true. In the mimicking strategy, add-on 
payments are treated like the initial investments, but take place at a later stage. From the time 
they are made, they follow the same risk pattern as the initial transaction. Early disbursements 
lower the capital at risk and therefore we deduct them at the relevant month from the 
prevailing equity. We determine the internal rate of return of the mimicking strategy until that 
date and calculate the present value of the disbursement at the transaction closing. That present 
value is then subtracted from the initial payment giving us two separate cash flows. The 
remaining equity following disbursement is retained in the mimicking portfolio until the exit, 
except where it becomes zero or negative. In this case, the position is closed on the 
disbursement. 
For the “write offs” the approach is straightforward.
24 Add-on investments in the “write off” 
cases are usually made to prevent the debt providers from claiming bankruptcy. The add-on 
payments would lower the leverage ratio immediately. However, the debt providers would not 
necessarily have asked for additional equity if the company’s prospects were still good. Debt 
providers thus demand the payment in order to maintain an acceptable leverage ratio. This 
leads us to consider that the leverage ratios are unaffected by the add-on investments in “write 
off” companies. This is supported by the fact that these engagements finally had to be written 
off, meaning that the debt claims could obviously not be serviced sufficiently and, hence, the 
leverage ratios could not be lowered. 
d) Changes in Ownership 
In some transactions the ownership structure changes within the holding period, either due to 
non-proportional add-on investments or distributions or by any execution of contingent claims 
such as conversion rights, or call or put options. If the ownership structure changes, it is noted 
in the transaction description but not in sufficient detail to permit further investigation. We 
account for these types of changes in the proportion of the equity stake at exit, thus again 







                                              
24 Premature disbursements in “write-off” transactions were not observed in our sample.  
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